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ORGAN TRANSPLANTS FOR PRISONERS: 
THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF INCARCERATION AND HEALTH CARE 
___________________________________ 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Death row.  In 1996, Horacio Alberto Reyes-Camerena was sentenced to death for the murder of 
an 18-year-old woman whom he stabbed to death.1  A lengthy Oregon State appeals process for death row 
inmates has kept him alive to date.2  His kidneys are failing as he awaits his execution.3  In 2003, a prison 
physician concluded that Camerena was a good candidate for a kidney transplant due to his end-stage 
kidney failure.4  The State of Oregon denied his request.5 
Life-in-Prison.  In 1967, James Earl Ray was sentenced to 99 years in a Tennessee state prison for 
the assassination of Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.6  While incarcerated, Ray was attacked and repeatedly 
stabbed 22 times by a fellow inmate.7  He developed cirrhosis of the liver as a result of a blood 
                                                        
1 DAVID L. HUDSON, PRISONERS’ RIGHTS 60 (Allan Marzilli, ed., 2007). 
2 Bryan Robinson, Death-Row Inmate Seeks Organ Transplant, ABC NEWS (May 28, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=90611. 
3 Id.  
4 HUDSON, supra note 1, at 60. 
5 ON MORAL MEDICINE: THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 437 (M. Therese Lysaught et al. eds., 3rd 
ed. 2012). 
6 Jessica Wright, Comment, Medically Necessary Organ Transplants for Prisoners: Who Is Responsible for 
Payment?, 39 B.C. L. REV. 1251 (1998). 
7 Id. 
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transfusion following the attack.8  Prison physicians concluded that Ray needed a liver transplant and was 
subsequently placed on the organ waiting list.9  The State of Tennessee requires postoperative care to be 
financed by the prisoner-patient.10  Ray was unable to raise the requisite funds to finance the transplant 
operation.11  He died of liver failure.12 
14-Years-in-Prison.  In 2002, an unknown California inmate who was serving a 14-year sentence 
for an armed robbery conviction, was given a heart transplant due to a viral illness contracted prior to his 
incarceration.13  The transplant cost the State of California $1 million.14  The inmate was still serving his 
sentence while undergoing postoperative care.15  The inmate died less than a year after his transplant.16  
His death was attributed to the inmate being “less than a model patient.”17   
The Eighth Amendment requires the government to provide prisoners with adequate medical 
care.18  Medical services offered to prisoners range from routine medical visits and checkups to resource 
intensive specialty care for chronic and terminal illnesses.  Specialty care includes the treatment of 
infectious diseases, chronic illnesses, mental health care, end-of-life care, and also organ failure.  
Unfortunately, the examples above highlight the multitude of barriers prisoners often experience when 
requiring medically necessary organ transplants.  In each of these cases, the treating physician’s 
recommendation for organ transplantation was rendered independent of the severity of the crime or the 
                                                        
8 Autopsy Confirms Ray Died of Liver Failure, CNN, April 24, 1998, 
http://www.cnn.com/US/9804/24/ray.autopsy.pm/ [hereinafter CNN Ray]. 
9 Wright, supra note 6, at 1251. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 CNN Ray, supra note 8. 
13 Prisoner Gets $1M Heart Transplant, CBSNEWS.COM (January 31, 2002), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/prisoner-gets-1m-heart-transplant/. 
14 Id. 
15 Kate Douglas, Comment, Prison Inmates Are Constitutionally Entitled to Organ Transplants-So Now What?, 49 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 539-40 (2005). 
16 Id. at 540. 
17 Id. at 540. 
18 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (“Prisoners retain the 
essence of human dignity inherent in all persons. Respect for that dignity animates the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment... A prison that deprives prisoners basic sustenance, including 
adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has no place in civilized society.”). 
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length of sentence.  And in each of these cases, despite the medical advice of the treating physician, the 
prisoner-patient was denied an organ or given inadequate postoperative care post-surgery. 
Supreme Court jurisprudence applying the Eighth Amendment to questions of medical care states 
that prison officials are to give great deference to the treating physician’s recommendation.19  However, 
medical judgment has been far from controlling when determining the scope of medical care provided a 
prisoner with a serious medical need.  Public opposition, resource allocation, and costs, all contribute to a 
prison health care system not providing the same level of care to non-incarcerated individuals.  As a result, 
a treating physician’s medical judgment, professional medical ethics, and the law have been routinely 
circumvented and many prisoners are left to suffer and/or die while incarcerated. 
Organ transplants for prisoners largely depend on society’s commitments to prisoners’ health and 
health care.20  Prisoners should have equal access to organs for transplantation because humanity and 
justice demand compassion.21  Anything to the contrary offends the principle that all people have the right 
to be treated with humanity and respect for their inherent dignity.  The Eighth Amendment demands that 
policies be developed to ensure prisoners are protected from extraneous factors impeding their access to 
organs.22  Moreover, they should be secured access to organs for transplantation under the same criteria 
that non-incarcerated individuals operate within.  Policy makers weigh public need and public opinion in 
developing and implementing solutions.23  Therefore, there must be a cultural shift in the current way 
                                                        
19 Marc J. Posner, Comment, The Estelle Medical Professional Judgment Standard: The Right of Those in State 
Custody to Receive High-Cost Medical Treatments, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 347, 351 (1992) (“Once the doctor has 
become involved in the treatment process (by actually prescribing treatment or by the state's attempt to influence the 
doctor before she prescribes), the two-pronged Estelle test gives great deference to the doctor's medical opinions.”) 
20 Jeffrey Kahn, Ethical Issues in Dialysis: The Ethics of Organ Transplantation for Prisoners, in SEMINARS IN 
DIALYSIS, 365–366 (Allen Spital, ed. 2003). (“Questions immediately emerge about how to justify the use of scarce 
organs for prisoners when law-abiding citizens are waiting. The answer to whether and why we ought to perform 
organ transplants for prisoners lies in how we understand society’s commitments to prisoners’ health and health care, 
and whether being incarcerated changes the priority of a patient waiting for a transplant.”) 
21 N.N. Dubler & B. Heyman, End-of-Life Care in Prisons and Jails, in Clinical Practice, in CORRECTIONAL 
MEDICINE 364 (M. Puisis, ed., 1998). (“[P]unishment and care are generally incompatible. Even if retribution is 
justifiable, dying alone, in pain, without comfort, exceeds the boundaries of the permissible for the vast majority of 
inmates…simple humanity and primitive justice demand compassion.”) 
22 E. Bernadette McKinney, J.D., Ph.D. et al., Offender Organ Transplants: Law, Ethics, Economics, and Health 
Policy, 9 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 39, 68-69 (2008). 
23 Id. at 61. (“Policy makers weigh public need and public opinion in developing and implementing solutions to 
perceived problems.”) 
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prisoners and their rights are perceived for any new policies to come to fruition.   Part II explores the 
current organ transplant and allocation process in the United States, the aging prison population, and 
prevailing societal attitudes towards prison health care and organ transplants.  Part III explores the legal 
rights of prisoners to organ transplants.  In particular, it explores the origins of the ban on “cruel and 
unusual punishment” and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence developing the concept and its application to 
prisoner medical care.  This section also highlights the current OPTN/UNOS allocation policies for 
prisoners as organ recipients and various international law covenants and treaties on the subject.  Part IV 
seeks to apply the Eighth Amendment right to adequate health care to the issue of organ transplantation 
for prisoners.  Moreover, it seeks to dispel the many prevailing arguments against prisoner transplantation, 
including the issues of costs and scarcity.  Finally, it explores the tension between professional medical 
ethics and the realities of incarceration. 
     
    
II. BACKGROUND 
 
Understanding the issue of organ transplants in prisoners necessitates an understanding of the 
organ transplant process and allocation system, the make-up of the United States prison population, 
ethical dilemmas, and the social and political attitudes towards their medical treatment. 
 
A. Organ Transplantation in the United States 
 
The idea of organ transplantation has been around since the time of the Ancient Greeks but 
attempts at transplantation were unsuccessful for thousands of years.24  The first successful organ 
transplant did not occur until 1954 in the United States; a kidney transplant from a donor to his identical 
twin brother.25  The successful procedure was hailed as one of the greatest achievements in modern 
surgery.26  However, fierce political and philosophical debate on a multitude of unique issues followed.  
                                                        
24 STEVE FARBER & HARLAN ABRAHAMS, ON THE LIST: FIXING AMERICA'S FAILING ORGAN TRANSPLANT SYSTEM 
17-18 (2009). 
25 DAVID HAMILTON, A HISTORY OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 426, (2012). 
26 Health Technology Achievements, NATIONALACADEMIES.ORG, 
http://www.nationalacademies.org/greatachievements/ga_16_3.html (last visited November 30, 2013). 
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Debates stemming from resource allocation to organ property rights began dominating the public 
discourse regarding transplants.27  The realities of a severely limited supply and a growing demand 
spawned a legitimate fear of the potential lengths and abuses to which society could go in procuring such 
a valuable commodity.  These included fears of a burgeoning black market for organs28, recipient 
discrimination29, and illegal procurement methods such as murder, theft, and organ harvesting.30    
 
  i. National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) 
 
Today, organ transplantation is no longer considered an experimental treatment.31  It is a common, 
acceptable, and successful treatment option for end-stage organ failure.32  In 2012, there were 28,053 life-
saving organ transplants from 14,015 donors (living and deceased).33  This is largely attributable to 
cultural acceptance, medical advances, and legal and political evolution.  Organ transplants are one of the 
most regulated areas of health care today.34 
Congress, mindful of the potential abuses in organ procurement and inequities in organ 
distribution, passed the National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) in 1984.35  NOTA included 
language that made it a crime for “any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any 
human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate 
commerce.”36  It also provided a much-needed framework for the transfer, allocation, and transplantation 
                                                        
27 Gwen Mayes, Buying and Selling Organs for Transplantation in the US: National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 
(NOTA) Bans Buying and Selling, MEDSCAPE.ORG, http://www.medscape.org/viewarticle/465200_2. 
28 Larry Rohter, THE ORGAN TRADE: A Global Black Market; Tracking the Sale of a Kidney On a Path of Poverty 
and Hope, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/23/world/organ-trade-global-black-market-
tracking-sale-kidney-path-poverty-hope.html. 
29 Charles T. Carlstrom & Christy D. Rollow, The Rationing of Transplantable Organs: A Troubled Lineup, 17 
CATO J. 163 (2007), available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/1997/11/cj17n2-
3.pdf. 
30 Rohter, supra note 28. 
31 Dulcinea A. Grantham, Comment, Transforming Transplantation: The Effect of the Health and Human Services 
Final Rule on the Organ Allocation System, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 751, 751 (2001) (“Organ transplantation, once a risky 
and uncommon procedure, is now a routine medical procedure with a relatively high success rate.”). 
32 Douglas, supra note 15, at 542. 
33 2012 Annual Report, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING 4 (Feb. 2013), 
http://www.unos.org/docs/AnnualReport2012.pdf [hereinafter UNOS Annual Report]. 
34 Legislation and Policy, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/legislation (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).  
35 Mayes, supra note 27, at 2. 
36 National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 274(e) (2006). 
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of organs within the federal system.  To this end, the Act established the Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network (OPTN) to maintain a national registry for organ matching.37  The Act called for 
the OPTN Network to be managed and operated by a private, non-profit organization under federal 
contract.38  Congress purposely chose the OPTN Network to be managed by a private organization to 
protect the organ allocation system from potential political interference.39 
 
  ii. United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) 
 
The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) is a nonprofit organization authorized by NOTA 
and contracted with the federal government to manage the OPTN Network.40  UNOS’s responsibilities 
include maintaining a list of individuals waiting for transplants, operating a system for matching donated 
organs with individuals on the waiting list, establishing medical criteria for allocating organs, collecting 
and analyzing data on organs donated and transplanted, and implementing methods to increase supply.41  
UNOS is also involved in most other aspects of the organ transplant process: requiring specific 
credentials of transplant surgeons and physicians, providing assistance to patients, monitoring transplant 
program compliance, and providing education to the public and health care professionals.42  
Every transplant program, procurement organization, and tissue-typing laboratory in the United 
States participates in UNOS.43  UNOS coordinates organ transplant efforts with 58 “organ procurement 
organizations” (OPOs) and 250 transplant centers—medical facilities that maintain organ transplantation 
                                                        
37 Id. at § 372. 
38 Id. at § 274(e). 
39 Wright, supra note 6, at 1255. (“Because UNOS is an independent, non-profit agency, its operations and policies 
are to some measure insulated from the political process.”) 
40 About Us, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, http://www.unos.org/about/index/.php (last visited Nov. 30, 
2013). 
41 RANDALL B. WILLIAMSON, ORGAN TRANSPLANT PROGRAMS: FEDERAL AGENCIES HAVE ACTED TO IMPROVE 
OVERSIGHT, BUT IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES REMAIN 9-11 (Apr. 28, 2008). 
42 Id. at 10. 
43 Id. at 9.  
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programs.44  Members also include professional scientific and medical organizations and individuals 
interested in organ donation or transplantations.45 
 
  iii. The Waiting List 
 
28,053 organ transplants were performed in 2012,46 however, over 120,000 patients remain on the 
waiting list.47  The swelling demand for organs continue to exceed the available supply.  Thousands of 
people, including those incarcerated, die each year while waiting for a suitable organ to become 
available.48 
 
   a. Waiting List Eligibility: Transplant Centers 
 
For most transplant candidates, including prisoners, the first step to receive an organ transplant is 
to get on the OPTN/UNOS transplant waiting list.49  This is a computer database that contains medical 
information on every person waiting for any type of organ transplant in the United States.50  A physician 
must give a patient a referral to be seen by a “transplant center” (also referred to as a “transplant 
hospital”) for an evaluation.51  Over 250 transplant centers exist in the United States.52  The medical staff 
at the transplant center determines whether the patient is an eligible candidate for entry onto the waiting 
list.53  The primary objective of the evaluation is to determine whether an organ transplant is medically 
necessary and likely to succeed.54  The evaluation usually consists of (but not limited to): blood & tissue 
                                                        
44 Talking About Transplantation: What Every Patient Needs to Know, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING 10 
(Feb. 2013), http://www.unos.org/docs/WEPNTK.pdf. [hereinafter UNOS What Every Patient Needs to Know]. 
45 Williamson, supra note 41, at 9. 
46 UNOS Annual Report, supra note 33, at 4. 
47 UNITED NETWORK OF ORGAN SHARING, http://www.unos.org (last visited Nov. 30, 2013).   
48 Legislation & Policy, supra note 34. (“[A]n average of 18 people die each day waiting for transplants that can't 
take place because of the shortage of donated organs.”) 
49 The National Waiting List, TRANSPLANTLIVING.ORG, http://www.transplantliving.org/before-the-
transplant/getting-on-the-list/the-national-waiting-list/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2013) [hereinafter Transplant Living: 
National Waiting List]. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 UNOS What Every Patient Needs to Know, supra note 44, at 10. 
53 The National Waiting List, supra note 49. 
54 UNOS What Every Patient Needs to Know, supra note 44, at 11. 
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typing, dental exams, chest x-rays, cardiac & pulmonary work-up, infectious disease testing, gender-
specific testing, and a psychological evaluation.55   
Non-medical factors are also generally evaluated to determine the probability of a good outcome 
post-organ surgery prior to wait list entry.56  OPTN/UNOS recognizes that life expectancy, 
behavior/character flaws, likelihood of compliance with medical advice, repeat transplantation, and the 
availability of alternative therapies, can influence eligibility determinations.57  However, UNOS stresses 
that such non-medical factors are to be applied broadly and universally—not directed to any particular 
class of individuals.58  
The patient’s ability to pay is often a controlling factor either by express policies at the transplant 
center or by limiting circumstance.59  Although every transplant center operates within a broad UNOS 
framework of rules, they each have certain discretion to apply their own criteria.60  A patient’s ability to 
pay is a legal and accepted criterion.61  Many transplant centers expressly require a patient to demonstrate 
an ability to pay for the transplant operation.62  Other transplant centers, such as the University of 
Michigan Transplant Center, try work with the patient to help provide some financial assistance or help 
navigate governmental assistance.63  Well-to-do patients are better positioned to explore various 
transplant centers and find centers with policies favorable to their situation.64  Lower-income individuals 
                                                        
55 Id. at 12. 
56 OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee General Considerations in Assessment for Transplant Candidacy, ORGAN 
PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/bioethics.asp?index=5 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2013). (“There is general agreement that non-medical transplant candidate criteria need to be 
evaluated. The legitimate substance of such an evaluation could cover a very wide range of topics.”) 
57 Id. 
58 Id. (“To the greatest extent possible, any acceptance criteria should be broad and universal…because we are 
serving individual human beings with highly complex medical situations, a process of individual evaluation must be 
maintained within the broad parameters.”) 
59 Joy Victory, Need an Organ? It Helps to Be Rich, ABC NEWS (June 26, 2006), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/story?id=1514702&page=2. 
60 Id. at 1. (“Each center sets its own criteria, which often include the patient's ability to pay.”) 
61 Id. 
62 Gina Kolata, Getting on a Transplant List is the First of Many Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1995, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/10/sports/getting-on-a-transplant-list-is-the-first-of-many-hurdles.html. 
63 Victory, supra note 59, at 2. 
64 Id. at 1. (“Centers have different practices. And if you're a well-to-do patient, you can shop around to centers. But 
if you don't have any money, you will go wherever is closest, and their policies are what you are stuck with.") 
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may not have the ability or resources to “shop” transplant facilities and are often pinned to policies at 
transplant centers conveniently located.65 
Many prisoners, on the other hand, do not have present financial capacity to fund such procedures.  
They often have their livelihoods stripped when entering the prison system and are at the mercy of the 
government to provide medical services on their behalf.  However, the government does not always 
intervene.  For example, James Earl Ray was medically qualified for a liver transplant but because he 
could not finance the operation, he was denied the organ transplant.66  The state refused to pay.67 
 
   b. Transplant Eligibility: Wait Times 
 
The waiting list is not the typical waiting list found at the DMV or at the local deli.  It is not a list 
where a patient simply waits his or her turn and is called on by order of placement on the list.  There is no 
number or rank.  The waiting list is a large pool of patients in a database containing the medical 
information of every person in the United States who is seeking an organ for transplantation.68  Each 
candidate’s medical prognosis and situation is unique, therefore, waiting times can vary and is dependent 
on a number of factors.69  
Some general principles guide the distribution or organs.  A patient’s medical urgency, blood 
tissue, size, time on the waiting list, age, and geographic proximity to the donor are taken into 
consideration.70   However, specifics on transplant eligibility and wait times vary by organ.71  UNOS has 
developed specific policies and guidance for each individual organ, taking into consideration a patient’s 
unique medical needs.72  For example, patients with kidney/renal failure can typically maintain dialysis 
treatments for a period of time before a kidney becomes available; priority for patients in need of livers 
                                                        
65 Id. 
66 Wright, supra note 6, at 1251. 
67 Id. 
68 Transplant Living: National Waiting List, supra note 49. 
69 Organ Type and Waiting Time, TRANSPLANTLIVING.ORG, http://www.transplantliving.org/before-the-
transplant/about-organ-allocation/waiting-for-an-organ/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2013). [hereinafter Transplant Living: 
Organ Type and Waiting Time]. 
70 Id. 
71 Id.  
72 UNOS What Every Patient Needs to Know, supra note 44, at 10. 
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often depend on their “Model for End-Stage Liver Disease” (MELD) score that measure the degree of 
medical urgency coupled with geography; priority for patients in need of hearts often depend on the 
geography of the donor and the patient coupled with medical urgency.73 
 
    1. Discrimination 
 
In 1995, baseball Hall-of-Famer, Mickey Mantle was diagnosed with end-stage liver disease due 
to liver cancer complicated by alcoholism.74  He was placed on the transplant waiting list for only two 
days before he underwent a liver transplant procedure.75  The average waiting time for a liver transplant at 
the time was 67 days.76  Mantle died two months after his transplant surgery from liver cancer.77  UNOS 
policies vehemently prohibit discrimination or favoritism of transplant recipients.78  “Candidates for 
transplantation shall not differ on the basis of a candidate’s citizenship or residency status in the United 
States…[a]llocation shall not be influenced by favoritism or discrimination based on political influence, 
national origin, race, sex, religion, or financial status.”79  However, cases like Mantle’s raise public 
distrust and questions about the discrepancy in access to organs between the well-to-do, famous, and the 
poor.  
 
  iv. Costs of Organ Transplantation 
 
Organ transplant procedures are among the most expensive medical procedures available.  High 
costs are primarily incurred for the procurement of the organ itself, the relative difficulty of the procedure, 
and the skill level required of the surgeon.80  Overall transplant costs include the initial evaluation, 
                                                        
73 Transplant Living: Organ Type and Waiting Time, supra note 69. 
74 Kolata, supra note 62. 
75 Id. 
76 Carlstrom & Rollow, supra note 29, at 163. 
77 Id. 
78 Policies and Bylaws §6.2.1, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, 
http://www.unos.org/About/policy_policies.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2013). 
79 Id. 
80 Organ Transplantation: The Process, ORGANDONOR.GOV, 
http://organdonor.gov/about/transplantationprocess.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2013). (“Costs include laboratory 
tests, organ procurement, transplant surgeons and other operating room personnel, in-hospital stays, transportation to 
and from the transplant hospital for surgery and for checkups, rehabilitation, including physical or occupational 
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surgery, postoperative care, tests and medication.81  The costs vary for each patient based on the patient’s 
individual medical needs and the type of organ needed for transplant.82  Transplant costs also vary due to 
limited supplies of available organs.  For example, a kidney transplant is among the least expensive organ 
transplant due to the relatively higher volume of supply compared to other organs.83  The average cost of 
a kidney transplant is $260,000 where a heart transplant averages around $1 million.84   
Transplant centers have the discretion to first establish a patient’s ability to pay for the transplant 
procedure prior entry on the organ waiting list.85  A patient’s ability to pay depends on the scope of their 
health insurance coverage (private or public) or ability to pay out-of-pocket.86  If a patient does have 
medical insurance, coverage for an organ transplant can sometimes depends on whether states recognize 
an organ transplant as an “essential health benefit.”87  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA) requires all health plans to cover “essential health benefits” which must include items and 
services within at least the following ten categories: ambulatory patient services; emergency services; 
hospitalization; maternity and newborn care; mental health and substance use disorder services; 
prescription drugs; rehabilitative services and devices; laboratory services; preventive and wellness 
services and chronic disease management; and pediatric services.88  However, whether a transplant is 
covered largely depends on what the state considers an essential health benefit.89  States are guided by a 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
therapy; and medications, including immunosuppressive or anti-rejection drugs which may cost up to $2,500 per 
month.”) 
81 Id. 
82 UNOS What Every Patient Needs to Know, supra note 44, at 30. (Chart of estimated costs per organ) 
83 Financing a Transplant, TRANSPLANTLIVING.ORG, http://www.transplantliving.org/before-the-
transplant/financing-a-transplant/the-costs/ (last visited, Nov. 20, 2013). 
84 Id.  
85 Victory, supra note 59. 
86 RW Evans, Abstract, Organ transplantation costs, insurance coverage, and reimbursement, BATTELLE SEATTLE 
RESEARCH CENTEr (1990), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/2103158. 
87 Current Policy Issues, AMERICAN KIDNEY FUND, http://www.kidneyfund.org/advocacy/policy-and-issues/policy-
issues.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2013). [hereinafter American Kidney Fund Policy Issues]. 
88 What Does Marketplace Health Insurance Cover, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/what-does-
marketplace-health-insurance-cover/ (last visited Dec 1, 2013). 
89 American Kidney Fund Policy Issues, supra note 87. (“CMS outlined an approach that would give each State the 
flexibility to define its essential health benefits package through the selection of an existing benchmark plan, rather 
than prescribe a specific list of items and services that all health plans must provide.”) 
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benchmarking plan rather than a specific list of items and services when prescribing what is mandatorily 
covered.90 
Federal insurance programs, including Medicare and Medicaid have covered end-stage renal 
disease and certain transplant procedures for over four decades.91  In 1972, Medicare was amended to 
cover people with end-stage renal disease regardless of their age.92  Notably, Medicaid—a cooperative 
program between states and the federal government—funds only certain health care expenses for low-
income or disabled persons.93  The states have discretion to develop eligibility and coverage criteria.94  
Medicare currently covers organ transplants under certain circumstances in approved facilities: heart, lung, 
kidney, pancreas, intestine, and liver.95  Medicare transplant coverage includes: diagnostics, 
immunosuppressive drugs, follow-up care, and the procurement of organs and tissues.96 
 
   a. Costs for Prisoners 
 
Whether a prisoner is covered for organ transplantation often depends on the state system and the 
policies therein.  In federal prisons, the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ general policy is not to provide organ 
transplants for federal inmates unless inconsistent with evolving community standards or the Medical 
Director makes an exception.97  The determination is usually made on a case-by-case basis and is based 
                                                        
90 Id. 
91 Timeline of Historical Events, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://organdonor.gov/legislation/timeline.html (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2013). 
92 H. Bradley Southern, Comment, Medicare's End-Stage Renal Disease Program: Its Development and 
Implications for Health Care Policy, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 225, 226 (1989). 
93 Melissa Wong, Comment, Coverage for Kidneys: The Intersection of Insurance and Organ Transplantation, 16 
CONN. INS. L.J. 535, 546 (2010) (“Medicaid is a cooperative program between the federal government and 
individual states to fund certain health care expenses for low-income or disabled persons who qualify.”) 
94 Id. at 546. (“While the federal government may set broad policies and ensure state compliance with the Medicaid 
statute, it is up to the states to develop state eligibility and coverage criteria subject to federal approval and 
reimbursement.”) 
95 Your Medicare Coverage: Transplants, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/coverage/transplants-
adults.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2013). 
96 Id. 
97 Press Release, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Statement of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, (Nov. 18, 1998), available 
at http://www.bop.gov/news/press/press_releases/ipaorg.jsp. 
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on factors including, the preservation of life, prevention of irreparable harm, or whether the procedure is 
experimental.98 
Some states attempt to address organ transplants for prisoners directly through legislation or 
regulation.  Washington State, for example, offers an “Offender Health Plan” which lists the health 
services and scope of health coverage available for inmates within the state.99  The Offender Health Plan 
specifically states that organ transplants are not to be funded by the state unless the “Utilization Review 
Committee” specifically authorizes the individual prisoner/patient for transplant.100  The Committee looks 
at alternative methods of securing funding for the organ transplant, such as, private insurance, social 
service groups, and nonprofit organizations.101  If funding cannot be secured through alternative sources, 
the Committee has the discretion to pay for or deny the transplant.102  For the most of the country, no 
formulaic policies exist as to state-funded organ transplants for the incarcerated—most opting for case-
by-case review.103 
The issue as to whether organ transplants for the incarcerated should be state funded is heavily 
contested.  What follows is the argument that a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and 
unusual punishment would be violated if a prisoner/patient could not afford his or her lifesaving 
procedure.  This is explored in-depth within the Constitutional Analysis in Part III. 
 
 
 B. The Aging Prison Population 
 
As the average age of the prison population rises to record levels, the reality faced by the 
government is that their inmates are becoming old and expensive to care for.  Over 1.5 million people are 
                                                        
98 Id.  
99 Washington State Dep't of Corrections, Offender Health Plan § 3 (Dec. 13, 1996). 
100 Id. § 4. 
101 Wright, supra note 6, at 1260. (“The Committee will first seek alternative methods of funding, such as private 
insurance or veterans groups.”) 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 1261. (“[I]ndividualized consideration of each inmate's case…will probably continue to be the predominant 
method of dealing with the funding question, at least until states see a need to formulate specific, written policies.”) 
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incarcerated in the United States—among the highest concentration of prisoners in the world.104  Adding 
additional strain on the prison system is that over 8% of the total prison population is above the age of 
55.105  The number of prisoners 55 and older is growing at exponential rates compared to the total prison 
population.106  The overall prison population has increased 42.1% from 1995 to 2010.107  The prison 
population of inmates 55 or older grew a staggering 282% during the same time span.108  The number of 
older prisoners is growing at a faster rate than the same age demographic within the general U.S. 
population.109  As prisoners age, they are at increasing risk of developing various disabilities and serious 
illnesses that require resource intensive medical therapies.110    
 
  i. Reasons for the Aging Prison Population 
 
There are varied reasons for the dramatic rise in the older inmate population.  One of the main 
factors has been the adoption of “tough on crime” policies implemented by state and federal legislators in 
an attempt to curb rising crime rates in the 1980s.111  The aggressive laws harshened punishments and 
increased the likelihood and length of prison sentences for criminal activity. 
                                                        
104 John V. Jacobi, Prison Health, Public Health: Obligations and Opportunities, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 447, 449 
(2005) (“Prison and jail populations increased more than four-fold from 1980 to 2003, from about 500,000 in 1980 
to over 2,000,000 in 2003. The rate of incarceration in the United States grew to 726 persons per 100,000 by 2004, 
far outstripping the imprisonment rates in every other country in the world for which such statistics are 
maintained.”) 
105 OLD BEHIND BARS, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 6 (January 2012), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usprisons0112webwcover_0_0.pdf. (“8 percent of sentenced state and 
federal prisoners are age 55 or older, more than doubling from 3 percent in 1995.”) [hereinafter HRW Old Behind 
Bars]. 
106 Id. at 19. (“In the last fifteen years, the number of men and women age 55 years or older in US prisons has grown 
markedly, and at an increasingly rapid pace. In 1995, there were 32,600. By 2010, there were 124,400.”) 
107 Id. at 20. (“The number of prisoners age 55 or older grew at a much faster rate than the total prison population, 
growing by 282 percent compared to a 42.1 percent increase in the prison population.”) 
108 Id.  
109 Id. (“The number of older prisoners is growing faster than the number of older persons in the US population, as is 
evident from the growth in incarceration rates relative to population.”) 
110 Id. at 43. (“As persons age, they are at increasing risk of developing various illnesses and disabilities.”) 
111 Felicia Cohn, The Ethics of End-of-Life Care for Prison Inmates, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 252, 253 (1999) (“This 
increase can be attributed to several policy trends of the 1980s. These include limits on judicial discretion in 
sentencing and releases, restrictions on community-based intermediate sanctions, “get-tough-on-crime” campaigns, 
“three-strikes-and-you-are-out” legislation, and state and federal laws mandating longer sentences for drug-related 
criminal convictions.”) 
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Tough-on-crime policies have contributed dramatically to the overcrowded prison system.112  
“Three-strikes” laws sent many repeat felony offenders to serve life sentences; “truth in sentencing” laws 
made it much more difficult for a prisoner to be released on parole without serving at least 85% of his or 
her sentence; and the establishment of mandatory minimum sentences and increased life-without-parole 
sentences.113  Federal prisoners serving life-sentences have no prospect of release in their lifetime because 
the federal system does not have parole.114  In state systems where parole is offered, many states have 
adopted harsher parole revocation policies that have returned high percentages of released offenders back 
to prison for parole violations.115  These policies have lead to an irreversible overcrowded prison 
environment and an increased financial burden on federal and state governments to provide care for them. 
Crime rates have declined since tough-on-crime laws began to be passed.116  However, it is 
debated as to whether these “front-end” tough-on-crime policies are directly attributable to the reduction 
in crime rates or attributed to other variables and societal trends.117  
 
  ii. Costs of Incarcerating the Elderly 
 
The government spends over $60 billion a year on its prison system.118  Anywhere from 9-30% of 
prison budgets are spent on inmate health care.119  The average costs for housing aging prisoners is up to 
                                                        
112 Id. 
113 HRW Old Behind Bars, supra note 106, at 24. (“State and federal legislators adopted laws that increased the 
likelihood and length of prison sentences, including by establishing mandatory minimum sentences and three strikes 
laws, and by increasing the number of crimes punished with life and life- without-parole sentences. In addition to 
these “front end” policy changes, the legislators sought to increase the amount of time prisoners would serve in 
prison before release, for example by establishing truth-in-sentencing conditions that require 85 percent or more of a 
prison sentence be served before the inmate becomes eligible for release, and by making some crimes ineligible for 
parole. Harsh parole revocation policies were also adopted that returned high percentages of released offenders to 
prison for technical parole violations.”) 
114 Id. at 36. 
115 Id. at 24.  
116 Id. (“These sentencing and release policies help explain why the US prison population has grown six-fold since 
1980, despite declining crime rates.”) 
117 Anthony Nagorski, Comment, Arguments Against the Use of Recidivist Statutes That Contain Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences, 5 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 214, 227 (2010) (“[L]ower rates could be attributed to the 
enactment of any number of new criminal statutes or deterrence methods, not necessarily due to the Three Strikes 
laws.”) 
118 Aging Inmate Committee, Aging Inmates: Correctional Issues and Initiatives,  Md. B.J., November/December 
2011, at 22. (“States spend over $60 billion per year to incarcerate their inmates.”) 
119 Phil Schaenman et al, Opportunities for Cost Savings in Corrections Without Sacrificing Service Quality: Inmate 
Health Care, URBAN INSTITUTE 3 (February 2013), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412754-
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three times higher than housing younger inmates.120  The prison environment is often less conducive to 
healthy living.  Prisoners tend to “age” much more rapidly than those similarly aged outside the prison 
system.121  Aging prisoners typically have serious health conditions, including, physiological and 
psychological health conditions, associated with people at least a decade older.122  Moreover, the common 
services for treating the elderly outside of prison—the need for walkers, wheelchairs, hearing aids, and 
daily assistance such as going to the toilet and eating—are also necessary for many aging inmates.123  
 
  iii. Methods for Addressing Increased Costs 
 
Prisoners are entitled under the Eighth Amendment to receive health care to at a level comparable 
to the care they could receive if not incarcerated.124  As prison populations rapidly rise and grow older, 
the costs of addressing their health care will continue to rise.125  Some states and the federal government 
have instituted cost saving methods to deal with this quandary.126  
 In 2014, Medicaid will expand the potential of medical coverage for inmates.127  Any inmate with 
an income below 133% of the federal poverty line will become Medicaid eligible for treatment services 
outside the prison.128  The cost-saving potential for states is great since many inmates will qualify.129  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Inmate-Health-Care.pdf. (“Typically 9 to 30 percent of corrections costs go to inmate health care. This amounts to 
hundreds of millions of dollars nationally.”) 
120 HRW Old Behind Bars, supra note 106, at 72. (“Older prisoners are at least two to three times as expensive to 
incarcerate as younger prisoners, primarily because of their greater medical needs.”) 
121 Id. at 17. ("[I]ncarcerated men and women typically have physiological and mental health conditions that are 
associated with people at least a decade older in the community.") 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 4. (“Prisons in the United States contain an ever growing number of aging men and women who cannot 
readily climb stairs, haul themselves to the top bunk, or walk long distances to meals or the pill line…who need 
wheelchairs, walkers, canes, portable oxygen, and hearing aids; who cannot get dressed, go to the bathroom, or 
bathe without help.”) 
124 Shaenman et al, supra note 119, at 3. (“Prisons and jails are required to provide health care to inmates at a level 
comparable to the care they could receive in the community if not incarcerated. It is considered an Eighth 
Amendment issue regarding cruel and unusual punishment.”) 
125 Carrie Abner, Graying Prisons, THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS 11 (December 2006), available at 
http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/sn0611GrayingPrisons.pdf. (“As America’s prisoners continue to grow 
older and sicker, the costs to states will continue to rise.”) 
126 Id.  
127 HRW OLD BEHIND BARS, supra note 106, at 79. (“In 2014, anyone with an income below 133 percent of the 
federal poverty line will become Medicaid eligible, which probably includes most inmates since they have little or 
no income.”) 
128 Id.  
129 Id.  
 17 
However, the cost savings would be minimized due to costs of transporting prisoners to and from outside 
medical facilities safely and securely.130  
The Federal Bureau of Prisons and some states have expanded medical and age criteria to 
increase eligibility for an early “compassionate release” program (or “medical parole”).131  Prisoners 
released under this program could be eligible for Medicare, Social Security, or veterans’ benefits, 
relieving a portion of the states’ financial burden for their care.132  Although the federal compassionate 
release program has been around since 1984, the program is whittled in bureaucracy, controversy, and 
implemented inconsistently.133  Only two-dozen prisoners are released each year on compassionate 
grounds.134  And nearly 1 in 8 prisoners die while awaiting a decision.135    
 
 
 C. Common Public Attitudes of Transplants for the Incarcerated 
 
The term “waiting list” alone makes it clear that organs are a precious and rare commodity.  
There are many more people on the waiting list than there are available organs.  And many die each year 
while waiting for an organ to become available.  This phenomenon creates a logical tension among 
awaiting recipients regarding eligibility hierarchy.  Media reports of Raj Rajaratnam, a wealthy white-
collar convict serving 11 years in federal prison for insider trading, attempting to secure a kidney 
transplant,136 and the unidentified California inmate who obtained a $1 million heart transplant but died a 
year later,137 sparked intense public backlash.  Some prisoners report that they receive better and more 
                                                        
130 Id. (“While Medicaid may help states defray some of the costs associated with hospital care provided outside the 
prison system, it will do nothing to relieve states of the considerable costs of transporting incarcerated men and 
women to and from outside service providers, nor will it help with the costs of providing officers to guard offenders 
while they are receiving community-based treatment.”) 
131 Richard A. Serrano, Government Explores Early Release For More Aging Prisoners, L.A. Times, Nov. 13 2013, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/nov/12/nation/la-na-prisoners-release-20131113. 
132 Abner, supra note 125, at 11. (“Proponents for this approach argue that once released, inmates may be eligible 
for Medicare, Social Security or veterans benefits, relieving a portion of the states’ financial burden for their care.”) 
133 Serrano, supra note 131. (“[T]he release program has been bogged down in bureaucracy and that wardens and 
judges remain reluctant to free inmates.”) 
134 Id.  
135 Id.  
136 Aaron Smith, Rajaratnam's kidney transplant could cost taxpayers $300,000, CNN MONEY (Oct. 21, 2011, 5:12 
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/10/21/news/companies/rajaratnam_kidney_taxpayer/. 
137 Douglas, supra note 15, at 539. 
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available medical care in prison than they do outside prison walls.138  There is an inherent sense of 
injustice when criminals secure scarce resources and available public finances from law-abiding citizens. 
On the other side of the debate is the argument that only “objective medical judgment” should 
guide eligibility decisions for securing organs.  Non-medical factors, including criminal records or 
incarceration status, should not be considered.  If such factors control eligibility, this could open up a 
litany of factors that may prevent certain social or economic classes from securing lifesaving transplant 
procedures.  Fundamental human rights and civil rights dictate that one’s social status should not be a 
controlling factor in medical decisions.  Due to a prisoner’s loss of freedom, the government has the 
responsibility to make sure their prisoners are not suffering while under their control.  As wards of the 
state, a prisoner is under the complete control and dominion of the state—analogous to the parent/child 
relationship.139  Prisoners cannot independently secure medical services; they are reliant on the system 
and its practitioners.  If correctional facilities fail to provide proper medical care, incarcerations could 
equate to a death sentence.140 
 
 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
 
Every prisoner in the United States has an Eighth Amendment right to adequate health care.141  It 
is considered “cruel and unusual punishment” for the government to ignore or interfere with this right – 
especially interfering with a physician’s prescribed treatment for a prisoner with a serious condition.142  
                                                        
138 Smith, supra note 136. (“Ex-prisoner, Levine, states, “I tell people that I had better medical care in prison," he 
said. "Going to prison probably did save my life.") 
139 McKinney, et al, supra note 22, at 64. (“Offenders become wards of the state and must depend on the state the 
same as a child in the state's custody.”) 
140 Id. at 65. (“The courts recognize the ethical problems associated with punishing a person by taking away his or 
her liberty and denying him basic necessities of life. If correctional facilities fail to provide proper medical care, 
every incarceration could become a death sentence.”) 
141 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 19, at 349. (“[I]n Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court held 
that the Eighth Amendment required the federal government and, through the Fourteenth Amendment, the states to 
provide medical care to prisoners.”) 
142 Plata, 131 U.S. at 1928. (“Prisoners retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons. Respect for that 
dignity animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment... A prison that deprives 
prisoners basic sustenance, including adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human dignity and 
has no place in civilized society.”) 
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However, despite Constitutional protections and evolving ethical and moral standards, the law is often 
ignored. 
 
 A. Constitutional Analysis 
 
Prisoners are stripped of some of their constitutional rights while incarcerated.  However, their 
right to humane treatment endures regardless of their incarceration status and their Eighth Amendment 
right against cruel and unusual punishment, which includes the right to receive adequate medical 
treatment, attaches. 
 
  i. Eighth Amendment: Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
 
The phrase “cruel and unusual punishment” first appeared in the English Bill of Rights of 1989: 
“Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted.”143  In the United States, the Eighth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution embodies “cruel and unusual punishment”: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”144  Early court cases limited 
Eighth Amendment protections due to the “hands-off doctrine.”145  According to the doctrine, the court 
lacked any jurisdiction to supervise the internal management of the criminal justice system.146  Any issues 
relating to the supervision of prisoners and internal prison affairs were beyond judicial review.147  The 
judiciary has evolved from the “hands-off doctrine.”148  It no longer precludes judicial review of 
constitutional infringements on prisoners’ rights.149  
                                                        
143 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976). 
144 U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
145 Michael Cameron Friedman, Note, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the Provision of Prison Medical Care: 
Challenging the Deliberate Indifference Standard, 45 VAND. L. REV. 921, 927 (1992) (“Before the 1960s, courts 
generally employed the hands-off doctrine, deferring to decisions made by prison administrators.”) 
146 Wagner v. Ragen, 213 F.2d 294, 295 (7th Cir. 1954). (“[P]rison officials are vested with wide discretion in 
safeguarding prisoners committed to their custody. Discipline reasonably maintained in State prisons is not under 
the supervisory direction of federal courts.”) 
147 Id.  
148 Friedman, supra note 145, at 928. (“Since the erosion of the hands-off doctrine, however, courts have shown 
much less deference to prison administrators in matters unrelated to prison discipline or security. Courts today do 
not hesitate to intervene to protect prisoners' fundamental constitutional rights.”) 
149 Id.  
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In addition to the hands off doctrine, early Eighth Amendment cases focused primarily on 
determining whether existing execution methods were “inherently cruel” to pass constitutional muster.150  
However, in 1910, the Supreme Court in Weems v. United States recognized the need for the Eighth 
Amendment to have wider application than its narrow interpretation.151  The Court began to reject the 
proposition that the Eighth Amendment only reaches punishments that are inhuman and barbarous.  
Rather, the Weems Court maintained that the Constitution is not “fastened to the obsolete but may acquire 
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a human justice.”152   
In 1958, the Supreme Court in Trop v. Dulles, in dicta, observed the concept of expanding Eighth 
Amendment application to the proportionality of punishments and substantive limits.153  The Trop Court 
dispelled any suggestion that a punishment must produce physical or mental suffering for the Eighth 
Amendment protection to attach.154  Rather, Justice Warren suggested that “the [Eighth] Amendment 
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”155  The Court began to focus less on whether physical and mental mistreatment existed but 
whether a punishment was “degrading to human dignity.”156  
 
   a. Deliberate Indifference Standard: Estelle v. Gamble 
                                                        
150 William H. Danne, Prison Conditions as Amounting to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 51 A.L.R.3d 111 (1973). 
(“The earliest, and still most frequently resorted to, test for determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual 
is an essentially subjective one which is grounded upon the concept that some punishments are so inherently cruel 
that no offense against society can justify them.”) 
151 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
152 Id. at 378. (“The clause of the Constitution, in the opinion of the learned commentators, may be therefore 
progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by 
a humane justice.”) 
153 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). 
154 Danne, supra note 150. (“In reasoning that the penalty of expatriation is violative of the Eighth Amendment 
precisely because of the fear and mental distress it causes, however, the Supreme Court, in Trop v Dulles (1958) 356 
US 86, 2 L Ed 2d 630, 78 S Ct 590, would appear to have dispelled once and for all any suggestion that a 
punishment must produce physical suffering in order to be characterized as cruel and unusual.”) 
155 Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01 (1958).  
156 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 271 (1972). (“The primary principle is that a punishment must not be so severe 
as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings. Pain, certainly, may be a factor in the judgment. The infliction of 
an extremely severe punishment will often entail physical suffering. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S., at 366, 
30 S.Ct., at 549.11 Yet the Framers also knew ‘that there could be exercises of cruelty by laws other than those 
which inflicted bodily pain or mutilation.’ Id., at 372, 30 S.Ct., at 551. Even though ‘(t)here may be involved no 
physical mistreatment, no primitive torture,’ Trop v. Dulles, supra, 356 U.S. at 101, 78 S.Ct., at 598, severe mental 
pain may be inherent in the infliction of a particular punishment. See Weems v. United States, supra, 217 U.S., at 
366, 30 S.Ct., at 549.”) 
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In 1976, the Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble extended Eighth Amendment protections to a 
prisoner’s right to adequate health care.157  Estelle challenged the old tradition of the ‘hands-off‘ doctrine 
of courts deferring to prison administrators' their actions.158  Estelle v. Gamble involved a state prisoner 
seeking treatment for back injuries sustained during an accident that occurred while he was doing prison 
work.159  He sought treatment for his injuries and was seen by medical personnel multiple times, however, 
he sued alleging that his medical treatment was inadequate.160  The Court, while rejecting his particular 
claim, recognized for the first time that the Eighth Amendment afforded prisoners the right to adequate 
health care.161 
The Estelle Court implemented a decision-making test to field Eighth Amendment “cruel and 
unusual punishment” questions as to whether a prisoner received unconstitutional health care.162  Also 
known as the “deliberate indifference standard,” it requires that the complainant show the physician or 
prison official displayed deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the prisoner and failed to 
respond.163  The Court in Wilson v. Seiter, refined the deliberate indifference standard in two prongs – 
both of which must be met for a prisoner to succeed in an Eighth Amendment claim of inadequate health 
care.164  (1) The complaining party must be able to demonstrate a “serious medical need” (objective), and 
(2) the defendant/government must have actual knowledge or awareness of the complaining party’s 
                                                        
157 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97 (1976).  
158 Brittany Bondurant, Comment, The Privatization of Prisons and Prisoner Healthcare: Addressing the Extent of 
Prisoners' Right to Healthcare, 39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 407, 414 (2013). (“Estelle was 
instrumental in challenging the old tradition of the ‘hands-off‘ doctrine, in which courts deferred to prison 
administrators' internal actions and decisions within prison facilities.”) 
159 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 288-89. 
160 Id.  
161 Id. at 103. (“[T]hese elementary principles establish the government's obligation to provide medical care for 
those whom it is punishing by incarceration. An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if 
the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met. In the worst cases, such a failure may actually produce 
physical torture or a lingering death.”) 
162 Id. at 104. (“[A] prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to 
serious medical needs. It is only such indifference that can offend “evolving standards of decency” in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment.”) 
163 Bondurant, supra note 158, at 414. (“The Court established the ‘deliberate indifference‘ standard, which requires 
that the complainant show the physician or prison official displayed deliberate indifference to the needs of the 
prisoner and failed to respond to medical needs that were sufficiently serious.”) 
164 Id. at 414-15. 
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serious medical need, and acts or omissions that indicate a failure to avert, or to take serious steps to avert, 
a serious risk of harm to the offender (subjective).165  In other words, if a correctional official knew or 
should have known about a prisoner’s serious medical needs, and either, disregards it, interferes with 
treatment, or provides care below the standard of care, that could constitute a violation of the prisoner’s 
Eighth Amendment rights. 
 
   b. Evolution of the Deliberate Indifference Standard 
 
Post Estelle cases broadened the scope of the deliberate indifference standard and in some cases 
narrowed it.   
 
    1. Difference in Medical Opinion 
 
In Estelle, the prisoner claimed that the treating physician acted with deliberate indifference in the 
treatment of his back injury by failing to order additional diagnostics for his lower back.166  The Court 
noted that the mere disagreement with the medical judgment of the treating physician did not constitute a 
deliberate indifference.167  A difference of opinion arising between medical professionals or between the 
inmate and the prison health care provider is also not necessarily a deliberate indifference.168  
 
    2. Requests for Experimental Treatment 
 
Cases involving a refusal of a prisoner’s request for “experimental treatment” have also been held 
to not qualify as a deliberate indifference.169  In Hawley v. Evans, an HIV patient was seeking a drug that 
at the time was deemed “experimental” in the treatment against HIV/AIDS.170  The Court denied his 
                                                        
165 Id.  
166 Estelle, 29 U.S. at 101. 
167 Douglas, supra note 6, at 549-50. (“Although some courts still speak of medical judgment, many cases instead 
refer to this concept as a “difference of opinion.” Where a decision concerning treatment or medication manifests 
nothing more than a difference of medical opinion, the courts have consistently held that this difference of opinion 
does not constitute deliberate indifference. Closer examination of post-Estelle cases reveal two occasions in which a 
difference of opinion may arise.”) 
168 Id. at 550. 
169 Id. at 551. (“Cases involving experimental treatment most frequently involve a prisoner's request for cutting-edge 
medication.88 When faced with such a demand, courts have held that refusal to provide prisoners with experimental 
treatment does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”) 
170 Hawley v. Evans, 716 F. Supp. 601 (N.D. Ga. 1989). 
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request holding that the drug [at the time] was experimental and that the Eighth Amendment does not 
extend to experimental treatments.171  In Harris v. Thigpen, the court ruled that prisoners are not entitled 
to “state of the art” treatment but only reasonable care according to the community standard.172 
 
    3. Providing Easier and Less Efficacious Treatment 
 
Cases where prison officials choose to provide “easier and less efficacious treatment” than other 
available options, constituted a deliberate indifference.173  In Williams v. Vincent, the case involved where 
a prisoner’s ear was severed in a prison fight.174  Rather than attempting to repair and reattach the ear, the 
physician threw away the severed ear and stitched up the stump.175  The court held that the physician 
displayed deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s serious medical need by providing “easier and less 
efficacious treatment” rather than attempting to reattach the ear.176  
 
    4. Medical Decisions Based on Costs 
 
The Supreme Court has not yet spoken directly to the issue of considering costs in a prisoners’ 
medical treatment.177  The Estelle Court did not mention costs when articulating the deliberate 
indifference standard.178  However, the majority of lower court decisions at issue have interpreted Estelle 
as to not allow the government to consider costs to allow a prisoners’ medical treatment to fall below a 
                                                        
171 Id. at 603. (“As long as Georgia's prison system is abiding by reasonable medical practices, the issue of whether 
to permit a prisoner to be treated with experimental drugs (many of which have not been approved by the FDA) is 
the “exclusive prerogative” of the state of Georgia.”) 
172 MICHAEL WELCH, IRONIES OF IMPRISONMENT 249 (Jerry Westby, ed., 2004) (citing Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 
1495 (11th Cir. 1991). 
173 JOSEPH ANTHONY MELUSKY & KEITH A. PESTO, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 
UNDER THE LAW 165 (2003). (Deliberate indifference included “a prison doctor’s choice of the easier and less 
efficacious treatment of throwing away the prisoner’s ear and stitching the stump rather than treating the prisoner 
after an altercation.”) 
174 Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1974). 
175 Id. at 543. (“Upon being taken to the prison hospital, Williams asked the hospital personnel to try to suture the 
severed portion of his ear back on. Instead, he alleges, they told him that he did not need his ear, threw it away, and 
sewed up the stump with ten stitches.”) 
176 Id. at 544. 
177 Wright, supra note 6, at 1269. (“In Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the court balances individual and 
governmental interest only in the context of discipline and security; the state's interest in limiting expenditures is not 
considered.”) 
178 Posner, supra note 19, at 353. (“[Estelle] does not seem to take the cost of the treatment into consideration at 
all.”) 
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minimally adequate level.179  This is not to say that economic factors may not be considered in choosing 
methods that achieve the same objective.180  However, the costs of protecting a prisoner’s constitutional 
right to adequate health care does not justify a total denial of treatment.181  
That the government should be responsible for funding a prisoner’s health care, including organ 
transplant treatments, is supported by many post-Estelle cases.  In Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional 
Inmates v. Lanzaro, the court held that “prisons should be and are constitutionally required to provide for 
[i.e., at the institution’s expense] all the serious medical needs of the inmates, whose imposed financial 
dependency is a result of their incarceration.”182  In Anacta v. Prison Health Services, the Eleventh Circuit 
held that refusing to provide a neurologic evaluation prescribed by a treating physician because the 
prisoner could not pay for the services constituted a deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.183  
And in Martin v. DeBruyn, the court held that “[a] prison official who withholds necessary medical care, 
for want of payment, from an inmate who could not pay would violate the inmate’s constitutional rights if 
the inmate’s medical needs were serious.”184  
 
   c. Deliberate Indifference in Organ Transplant Cases 
 
Applying the deliberate indifference two prong test to a prisoner’s need for organ transplants 
unequivocally attaches a constitutional right to receiving such treatment.  The first prong of 
“demonstrating a serious medical need” is easily met because an organ transplant is usually recommended 
                                                        
179 Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1573 (11th Cir. 1985). (“The state's interest in limiting the cost of 
detention, for example, ordinarily will justify the state's decision to provide detainees with a reasonable level of food, 
living space, and medical care. Yet that same objective will justify neither the complete denial of those necessities 
nor the provision of those necessities below some minimally adequate level. Due process must require states to 
provide pretrial detainees with some minimal level of these necessities, and the failure to provide that level of 
necessities violates due process-even though the conditions imposed serve some ordinarily legitimate state 
objective.”) 
180 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977). (“This is not to say that economic factors may not be considered, for 
example, in choosing the methods used to provide meaningful access. But the cost of protecting a constitutional 
right cannot justify its total denial.”) 
181 Id.  
182 Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 345 (3d Cir. 1987) 
183 Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The knowledge of the need for medical 
care and intentional refusal to provide that care has consistently been held to surpass negligence and constitute 
deliberate indifference.”) 
184 Martin v. Debruyn, 880 F. Supp. 610, 615 (N.D. Ind. 1995) 
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as a “last resort” treatment.  In most cases, a person is unable to sustain life with a failing heart, liver, or 
kidney.  
The second prong, finding a deliberate indifference to the inmate’s serious medical condition by 
failing to provide a prisoner with an organ transplant, can be analogized by the direction in which the 
courts are moving.185  In Fernandez v. United States, a federal prisoner was in need of a life-saving heart 
transplant.186  The prisoner was refused a medical furlough, a reduction in sentence, a parole, and a 
pardon because he did not meet the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ requirement that a prisoner must 
demonstrate an ability to pay for the procedure.187  The Eleventh Circuit held that the enforcement of the 
Bureau’s guidelines denied the prisoner the opportunity to receive an organ transplant but did not 
constitute a deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs due to continuing treatment of his 
illnesses.188  
However, nine years later the Eighth Circuit expressed concern regarding the Bureau’s restrictive 
policy regarding transplants in a series of cases.189  In Barron v. Keohane, Eighth Circuit Judge Richard 
Arnold, in dicta, expressed concern over the Bureau’s policy: “[g]iven the Bureau's obligation to provide 
medical care to prisoners, see 18 U.S.C. § 4042, denial of a transplant to an inmate who needs-but cannot 
pay for-a transplant may raise constitutional concerns.”190  And again in Clark v. Hedrick, in dicta, Judge 
Arnold stated: “[w]e remind the Bureau of Prisons that its policies in connection with transplants, if 
applied inflexibly, may raise constitutional questions.”191  
 
   d. Deference to Medical Judgment 
                                                        
185 Douglas, supra note 6, at 556. (“Though no published court opinion has expressly held that failure to provide 
inmates with transplants constitutes deliberate indifference, two recent Eighth Circuit opinions indicate that this is 
the direction in which the courts are moving.”) 
186 Fernandez v. United States, 941 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1991). 
187 Id. at 1492-93. 
188 Id. at 1493-94. (An inmate's entitlement to medical treatment “reasonably commensurate with modern medical 
science and of a quality acceptable within prudent professional standards” is undisputed. To establish a valid eighth 
amendment claim, “a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence [the] deliberate 
indifference [of prison officials] to [his] serious medical needs.”) 
189 Douglas, supra note 6, at 556. (“Two recent Eighth Circuit opinions indicate that this is the direction in which the 
courts are moving.”) 
190 Barron v. Keohane, 216 F.3d 692, 693 (8th Cir. 2000). 
191 Clark v. Hedrick, 233 F.3d 1093, 1094 (8th Cir. 2000). 
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The right of prisoners to receive organ transplant can also be analogized by the great deference to 
the medical judgment of the treating physician afforded by Estelle.192  Once a physician has diagnosed an 
illness as serious and has ordered particular treatment, prison officials cannot violate, ignore, or interfere 
with the order.193  The prisoner’s Eighth Amendment protections entitles him or her to receive the 
treatment the medical professional decides is necessary for the treatment of a serious medical need.194  
This especially applies to decisions not to afford Plaintiff an operation that would render the prisoner-
patient’s condition irreparable,195 or cause him or her “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”196 
Moreover, if a treating physician’s recommendation has not been flatly denied but delayed for non-
medical reasons, this constitutes a deliberate indifference.197 
 
  ii. Fourteenth Amendment 
 
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of the federal government’s use of cruel and unusual 
punishment and the right to health care for the incarcerated is also applied to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause.198  The Fourteenth Amendment regulates the conduct of the 
                                                        
192 Posner, supra note 19, at 351. (“Once the doctor has become involved in the treatment process [by actually 
prescribing treatment or by the state's attempt to influence the doctor before she prescribes], the two-pronged Estelle 
test gives great deference to the doctor's medical opinions.”) 
193 Id. at 351-52. (“More significantly, the “deliberate indifference” prong also accords the prescribing doctor's 
judgment significant weight. Because courts have held that prison officials' intentional interference with prescribed 
medical treatment constitutes “deliberate indifference,” the prisoner is constitutionally entitled to whatever treatment 
the medical professional decides is necessary. Thus, under the Estelle test, the doctor determines to a large degree 
the prisoner's constitutional right to receive medical care.”) 
194 Id.  
195 Derrickson v. Keve, 390 F. Supp. 905 (D. Del. 1975). (“[A] decision not to perform a tonsillectomy and 
submucus resection of nasal septum would mean that prisoner's condition would be irreparable a decision by prison 
officials never to allow prisoner to elect such surgery, which the prison's own physician had recommended, would 
be arbitrary, capricious, and cruel, but on the other hand, the authorities had not exceeded their discretion in failing 
to provide surgery to date.”) 
196 Lanzaro, supra note 182, at 346. 
197 Ancata, 769 F.2d at 704. 
198 Bondurant, supra note 158, at 411. (“The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on the federal government's use of 
cruel and unusual punishment is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, which 
regulates the conduct of the states in accordance with the Constitution.”) 
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states in accordance with the Constitution.199  Therefore, prisoners may bring Eighth Amendment actions 
against both federal and state prison authorities.200   
 
 
 B. OPTN/UNOS Policy 
 
The OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee directly addressed the ethical debate regarding organ 
transplants for convicted criminals.201  In an official opinion paper on the subject, it labeled any type of 
exclusion of criminals from medical treatment, including an organ transplant procedure, as not ethically 
legitimate.202  “The UNOS allocation system is based on the principles of equity and medical utility.”203  
Wealth, social status, citizenship, and status as a prisoner are not legitimate factors guiding allocation 
decisions.204  
The OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee acknowledged that non-medical decisions—prior to a 
patient’s placement on the waitlist—could be made at the discretion of the transplant team so long as the 
decisions are based on their relative impact to transplant outcomes.205  However, once a patient is placed 
on the waitlist, the patient is eligible for the equitable allocation of organs.206 
 
 
 C. International Law 
 
Various international treaties and covenants also support the right of medical care for prisoners.  
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognizes the “right of everyone to 
                                                        
199 Id.  
200 Douglas, supra note 15, at 545. 
201 OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee Position Statement Regarding Convicted Criminals and Transplant Evaluation, 
Organ Procurement and Transplant Network, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/bioethics.asp?index=3 (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2013). [hereinafter OPTN Inmate Policy]. 
202 Id. (“Punitive attitudes that completely exclude those convicted of crimes from receiving medical treatment, 
including an organ transplant are not ethically legitimate.”) 
203 Id.  
204 Id.  
205 Id. (“Consideration of prisoners as well as others for transplantation includes evaluation of medical and non-
medical factors relative to their impact on transplant outcome. Screening for all potential recipients should be done 
at the candidacy stage and once listed, all candidates should be eligible for equitable allocation of organs.”) 
206 Id. (“Screening for all potential recipients should be done at the candidacy stage and once listed, all candidates 
should be eligible for equitable allocation of organs.”) 
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the highest attainable standards of health.”207  The United States has not ratified the ICESCR and, 
therefore, is not legally binding.208  However, because the United States is a signatory, it undertakes a 
number of legal obligations, including, refraining from undermining the intent and purpose of the 
treaty.209  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, to which the United States is a party, 
guarantees all persons the right to life, to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.210  People 
deprived of their liberty, such as prisoners, must be treated with humanity and with respect and inherent 
dignity.211  It specifically requires that governments provide “adequate medical care during detention.”212   
The United States is also a party to the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).213  The CAT prohibits cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment.214  Failure to provide adequate medical care to prisoners is a violation of the CAT.215 
 
 
IV. ARGUMENT 
 
Whatever ambivalent feelings individuals, communities, or government officials may have about 
a prisoner’s access to organs, the law is quite clear on the subject.  The Constitution, OPTN/UNOS 
policies, and international law are clear – when based on purely objective medical criteria, a prisoner 
cannot be interfered with or withheld from receiving a medically necessary organ transplant.  In practice, 
however, the law is often circumvented due to matters such as health care costs, organ scarcity, public 
opposition, and value for life. 
 
 
 A. Scope of “Adequate” Health Care for Prisoners 
                                                        
207 ICESCR, art. 11. 
208 HRW Old Behind Bars, supra note 106, at 72. 
209 Id.  
210 ICCPR, arts. 6, 7, 10(1). 
211 Id.  
212 Pinto v. Trinidad and Tobago, (Communication No. 232/1987) Report of the Human Rights Committee, vol. 2, 
UN Doc A/45/40, p. 69. 
213 HRW Old Behind Bars, supra note 106, at 72. 
214 CAT, art. 16. 
215 HRW Old Behind Bars, supra note 106, at 72. 
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Estelle v. Gamble effectively entitled prisoners to receive adequate medical care.216  The irony is 
that no such right exists for the general public.  In fact, many inmates receive better medical care while 
behind bars than they had as a free member of society.217  In exchange, prisoners forfeit many of their 
core rights and freedoms when incarcerated including their liberties and their right to vote.  Although 
imprisoning those who commit crimes is an effective method to keep the general public safe, in turn, the 
government has an obligation to treat prisoners safe and humanely as well.218 
The Supreme Court in Estelle did not set an exact scope of the medical treatment that should be 
afforded to prisoners.  The Court merely set the floor that the treatment of prisoners, including their 
medical care, should not offend “evolving standards of decency”219 – which likely includes the provision 
of health care up to the standards of care for the general public.  Organ transplant is often a last resort in 
treating a patient with end-stage organ failure.  These are not simple surgeries nor are organ transplant 
decisions taken lightly.  Organ transplants are complex; they require heightened skill, attention, and 
expense.  Despite these complexities, organ transplantation has become the standard of care and, in most 
cases, is the treatment of choice for end-stage organ disease.220  Advances in surgical and organ-
preservation techniques, improved immunosuppressive and antiviral regimens, and changes in donor-
organ allocation have improved the success rates of solid-organ transplantation.221  Transplantation 
replaces end-stage disease with a more sustainable disease state and has substantial clinical advantages.222  
                                                        
216 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97 (1976). 
217 Smith, supra note 136. 
218 Kahn, supra note 20, at 365. (“[B]y using prison as a means of protecting the public, society creates an obligation 
to keep prisoners safe and treat them humanely, which ought to include health care.”) 
219 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. 
220 CHRISTOPHER LAROSA, ET AL., SOLID-ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION IN CHILDHOOD: TRANSITIONING TO ADULT 
HEALTH CARE 743 (Mar. 7, 2011), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/127/4/742.full.pdf. 
(“Solid-organ transplantation has become the standard of care and, in most cases, is the treatment of choice for end-
stage organ disease. Advances in surgical and organ-preservation techniques, improved immunosuppressive and 
antiviral regimens, and changes in donor-organ allocation have improved the success rates of solid-organ 
transplantation. Transplantation, in essence, replaces end-stage disease with a more sustainable chronic disease state, 
and its consequences have substantial clinical and psychosocial implications.”) 
221 Id.  
222 Id.  
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Organ transplants are woven into the fabric of available treatment options.  As the Eighth Amendment 
evolves contemporaneously with society, organ transplant treatments are also included. 
 
 
B. The Truth about Costs to the Taxpayer 
 
Organ transplant procurement and procedures are among the most expensive medical treatments 
available.  An organ transplant procedure can range anywhere from $200,000 to over $1,000,000 
depending on the organ transplant and the medical needs of the patient.223  In the case of the unknown 
California inmate who received a $1 million heart transplant, much of the public outcry came as a result 
of the taxpayers footing the bill.  However, arguments over costs for organ transplants are often 
misguided. 
The issue is of “perceived” costs rather than “actual” costs.224  The government must provide 
medical care for its incarcerated.  Paying for a one-time organ transplant would, in theory, save the 
government/taxpayer money compared to the annual expense of medically managing a chronically ill 
prisoner with a failing organ.  For example, treating a prisoner serving a life-sentence suffering from end-
stage kidney failure with dialysis treatments is estimated to cost over $120,000 per year for the life of the 
prisoner-patient.225  The average cost for a kidney transplant procedure plus immunosuppressant therapy 
costs just over $260,000 total.226  The net-cost savings alone make it economically advantageous for the 
government to remove any barriers and encourage medically necessary organ transplants as a viable 
treatment option for their prisoners.  
 
 
 C. Scarcity Debate 
 
                                                        
223 Financing a Transplant, supra note 83. 
224 Douglas, supra note 15, at 565. (“Consequently, another potential solution to the public outcry against prisoner 
organ transplants may be to educate the public about the actual, rather than the perceived, costs of providing inmates 
with organ transplants.”) 
225 Robinson, supra note 2. (“[Oregon] pays a reported $121,000 a year to keep [inmate] Reyes-Camarena on 
dialysis.”) 
226 Financing a Transplant, supra note 83. 
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Every 10 minutes someone in the United States is added to the organ waiting list.227  Each day, an 
average of 79 people receive an organ transplant.228  However, 18 people die every day waiting for a 
transplant.  The demand for organs well exceeds the available supply.  The scarcity of available organs 
creates an obvious tension regarding “worthiness” when allocation decisions are being made.  A common, 
yet dangerous, view is that those with more social or societal value are more deserving of organs; 
prisoners who have committed crimes against society should not be placed above any law-abiding citizen 
in seeking life-saving treatment.  Any policy that assigns a lower priority to prisoners would be based on 
the dangerous premise that prisoners are less valuable human beings.  A precedent would be created 
within the transplant system that social worth is a legitimate consideration when making organ allocation 
decisions.229  The slippery slope arguments that flow from this view are obvious. 
Using prejudices as the criteria to which the government decides what medical treatment will be 
received and to who opens up a litany of opportunity to justify classism—government sanctioned 
classism.  Prisoners may not be the only population whose eligibility gets closely examined.230  Accepting 
classism as “official government policy” has implications that stem much further from the prisoner-organ 
transplant debate.  Such a policy has the potential to be applied well beyond just the distribution or organs.  
 
 
 D. Protecting Medical Ethics 
 
The goals of capital punishment are contrary to the goals and aims of medicine and vice-versa.231  
Physicians and health care providers in the prison system often experience tension between their oath to 
                                                        
227 About Donation & Transplantation, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://organdonor.gov/about/data.html (last visited Dec. 
3. 2013).  
228 Id.  
229 Kahn, supra note 20, at 366. (“Any policy that would award lower priority to prisoners would be based on some 
sense that prisoners are less valuable members of society and would introduce the notion of social worth to the entire 
transplant system.”) 
230 Id. (“The truth is that if social worth becomes a criterion for judging who gets transplants first—or maybe who 
gets them at all—then it is not only prisoners whose eligibility should be examined.”) 
231 McKinney et al, supra note 22, at 63. (“Much of that negotiating power is taken away from the incarcerated 
individual. Usually, the offender is offered one treatment option and his or her only choice is to take it or leave it. 
Furthermore, the goals of incarceration are contrary to the goals of medicine. Health-care providers in the prison 
context encounter pressures to adopt the goals of incarceration and abandon their professional goals of providing 
compassionate attention for individual medical needs.”) 
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treat the individual patient with compassion and attention to their medical needs, and the realities of the 
patient’s incarceration status. 
However, a physician has a duty to do all that he or she can for the benefit of the patient.  The 
AMA Code of Ethics suggests that policies that allocate limited resources have the potential to limit a 
physician’s ability to adequately fulfill their obligation to their patients.232  The treating physician must 
remain a patient advocate and therefore not partake in any allocation decisions.233  Moreover, it is not in 
the physician’s purview to consider non-medical criteria, such as the ability to pay, age, social worth, 
perceived obstacles to treatment.234  A physician must not be asked to balance competing non-medical 
interests of a prisoner seeking an organ transplant; the government and UNOS is charged with making 
such determinations.  While there may be strong and varying opinions on the subject, it is not the role of 
the physician to interpret or be encouraged by societal values.235 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Legal and ethical norms support the notion that medically qualified prisoners should be able to 
obtain organ donations regardless of their incarceration status, how violent the crime, and their ability to 
pay.  However, whether organ transplants for prisoners actually get performed strongly depends on 
society’s commitments to a prisoner’s health and health care.236  A prisoner receiving an organ transplant 
creates a perceived injustice; murderers, thieves, and rapists could secure a life-saving organ from a law-
abiding citizen who is of the same medical need.  The scarce donor pool and current donation policies 
offer no solution to the paradox.  However, consider the alternatives.  Any policy where medical 
                                                        
232 Opinion 2.03, Allocation of Limited Medical Resources, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (June 1994), 
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-
ethics/opinion203.page?. 
233 Id.  
234 Id. (“In making quality of life judgments, patients should first be prioritized so that death or extremely poor 
outcomes are avoided; then, patients should be prioritized according to change in quality of life, but only when there 
are very substantial differences among patients. Non-medical criteria, such as ability to pay, age, social worth, 
perceived obstacles to treatment, patient contribution to illness, or past use of resources should not be considered.”) 
235 John Fung, MD., Op-Ed, Organ Donation to Prisoners: Ethics and the Law, ABC NEWS (March 3, 2013), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/story?id=116967. 
236 Kahn, supra note 20, at 365. 
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judgment is subordinate to non-medical factors such as societal worth could have damaging effects on 
society beyond transplant decisions. 
The debate and case law regarding prisoner organ transplants have only begun to develop.  The 
number of aging men and women confined in United States prisons will continue to grow.  And the 
connection between the increase of aging inmates and the subsequent increase in the need to treat 
chronically ill prisoners with organ transplants will continue to become more prevalent absent significant 
policy changes. 
 
 
